Ergenekon, ideology, and power

A large and highly anticipated trial opened in Turkey yesterday--that of 76 Turks, including multiple former military officers, for conspiring to overthrow the democratically-elected government of Turkey. Several have been charged with murder, and others with supporting various terrorist groups. This group is called Ergenekon, taking its name from the mythical Central Asian home of the Turks.

This is big news: I won't try to detail the whole situation (see the NYT for that), instead I'll try to explain how this trial fits into the current struggle to define 21st-century Turkey.

First, a little background. It is widely assumed that Ergenekon has evolved from an American-backed Cold War program known as Operation Gladio. Basically, the U.S. set up right-wing terrorist cells all over Europe that would harrass Soviet troops if they ever occupied NATO countries. Trouble is, these gangs didn't disband themselves at the end of the Cold War: instead, they morphed into violent right-wing gangs with links to organized crime and hate groups. Several European countries, most notably Italy, have fought to root these groups out for over two decades.

The existence of a Gladio-type group has been suspected in Turkey since the late 1970's. These were years of terrible political violence, and on several occasions, a strange thing happened: ballistic analysis would show that leftist fighters had been killed by guns that had also killed rightists. Someone was in the middle, killing people on both sides. Can you say agent provocateur? I mentioned in a previous post that there were elements in Turkey that had much to gain from an unstable, violent Turkey in the 1970's--they probably acted through an early form of Ergenekon to prompt the 1980 coup.

This current chapter of the Ergenekon story began when the Cumhuriyet Daily, a staunchly pro-military, anti-reform paper, was bombed in 2006. The same type and series of grenades that were used in the Cumhuriyet attack were later found in a safe house, later tied to several members of Ergenekon. At this point, one says, ''Huh. Why would a right-wing group bomb a right-wing paper?'' Well, those same right-wingers tried to blame the bombing on the Kurdish terrorists and radical Muslim terrorists.

It also appears that Ergenekon is linked to the murder of multiple pro-reform journalists and the burning of several Kurdish bookshops in the southeast. Finally, Ergenekon is also accused of ties to the PKK and Hizbollah. (Kurdish terrorists and radical Muslim terrorists, respectively. See above and shake your head.)

The idea was simple: unleash a wave of terror and destabilize the government, prompting a coup that would be welcomed by a populace weary of violence. This was not targeted at any single party, but could be ''turned on'' when necessary. It seems that Ergenekon was being ''turned on'' because the AKP, Turkey's ruling party, threated the interests of Ergenekon. (I'll get to that in a minute.)

If these charges are true, it will mean that many of Turkey's recent security problems have been aggravated by a group of men (and a few women) who ''love'' Turkey so much they are willing to destroy it. I think the evidence is pretty clear: this is a shadowy, murderous group with no regard for democracy. They intended to return Turkey to military rule of the harshest sort.

What is particularly unusual about this cases is that several former military officers have been charged. I intend to write about the military's role in society soon, but briefly: officers have always been untouchable. Their immunity is now challenged, and if they are guilty and sent to jail, it will be a giant step toward the equal application of the law in Turkey.

Like I said, this trial is part of a struggle to define 21st-century Turkey. For 85 years, Turkey has adhered (more or less) to the six principles of Kemalism, as laid down by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. (Republicanism, populism, secularism, revolutionism, nationalism, and etatism. Etatism is dead--the other five live on.) This is a deeply ideological state: policies are not assessed by their effectiveness, but by whether they jive with Ataturk's ideas. Ergenekon is the most radical defender of these principles. After all, you don't see ''democracy'' or ''liberty'' on that list.

The AKP, Turkey's ruling party, regularly declares its allegiance to Ataturk's principles, but no one (including me) believes them. (I think they're modernizers; lots of secular Turks think the AKP wants sharia law, which is crazy talk.) This is the least ideological government Turkey has had since 1923, and radical Kemalists are not happy about that. Some fight the AKP in parliament, others try to get it banned by the Constitutional Court, and Ergenekon prepares to destabilize the country and launch a coup.

(I'll write about the bizarre relationship between Kemalists and modernization soon--it's a doozy.)

I'm not saying there's anything wrong with Kemalism, but what is crazy is blind allegiance to it. The AKP and its reformist allies are focused on performance, not on the (admirable) principles of a man who died 70 years ago. It is time for Turkey to move past Kemalism, and this Ergenekon case is progress. Democracy (not one of Ataturk's principles!) cannot exist when the threat of a coup looms at every moment, and in Turkey, it does. The Turkish military is independent from the democratic government, and elected officials always have to be careful not to make the generals angry--that's the kind of thing that can prompt a coup, or at least a strongly-worded warning.

This struggle is also about power. Ergenekon represents the interests of an old oligarchy that is challenged by a new one, the AKP. (I won't pretend that the AKP is some ''power to the people'' movement--it's a new business elite pandering to religious people and liberal reformers, but it's a little better than the old parties.) Ergenekon is made up of retired military officers, media personalities, old-guard businessmen, and other elites that feel their influence waning: they have always lived in a Turkey where no one questioned their superiority, their near-divine right to rule.

Now, the AKP threatens the status quo. So these elites--who have no regard for democracy or liberalism, except when it serves them--do whatever is necessary to preserve Turkey's anachronistic power structure, even if that means killing people and ''palling around with terrorists.'' (For real.) They have been caught. I hope these bastards go to jail for a long time.

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Soon: my meandering trip through the east.